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ABSOLUTE RETURNS CORRUPT
ABSOLUTELY: THE PUERTO RICAN
DEBT CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR
A FIDUCIARY STANDARD
Jean-Pierre Bado, Esq.
I. INTRODUCTIONA S a young man, Juan Burgos Rosado moved from Puerto Rico to
the Hispanic area of the Bronx. He returned to his homeland
fifteen years later with a new understanding of hard work. He
had spent years furnishing bodegas as well as repairing and selling used
motor vehicles.' Upon his return to the island, he renovated real estate
properties for rent or resale without having banks finance his business
operations. 2 He successfully ran his business until November 2011, when
he took a dangerous fall from a tall ladder.3 Upon the advice of a Union
Bank of Switzerland ("UBS") registered representative, Juan purchased
$1,125,000 in proprietary UBS closed-end funds from December 2011
through January 2013.4
At the time of his purchases, Juan did not know that UBS was the sole
liquidity provider, market maker, and asset manager of those closed-end
funds. In addition, Juan did not know that UBS had earned revenue on
these purchases from spreads, commissions, and underwriting fees. 5 Juan
did not know that his life's earnings were over-concentrated with unsuita-
ble investments. 6 By March 2015, Juan's investments had lost $737,000 in
value.7 Unfortunately, Juan's losses were neither unavoidable nor note-
worthy. In July 2014, UBS reported that customer complaints and arbi-
tration claims totaled over $600 million in damages for clients in Puerto
Rico who owned closed-end funds.8




3. Id. at 3-4.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Kyle Glazier, UBS Discloses More Than $600 Million of Claims Filed By PR Inves-
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In conducting a review of the Great Recession of 2008, federal agencies
noted that registered representatives had been acting as financial advisers
for some time;9 however, financial institutions were not acting in their
clients' best interests, nor were they required to. By 2013, that inaction
led to a business model that created a conflict of interest for the country
of Puerto Rico. If Congress had adopted a "uniform fiduciary standard"
as recommended by multiple federal agencies, then this conflicting busi-
ness model would not have been possible. Furthermore, if Congress con-
tinues to fail to take action, more American retail investors will suffer the
same inevitable fate. The issues that arose in Puerto Rico provide an
example of what will happen to other retail investors if financial compa-
nies are allowed to continue to advise and counsel their clients without
regard to their fiduciary responsibilities.
This paper will address the need to establish a uniform fiduciary stan-
dard in the context of the statutory landscape behind the fiduciary stan-
dard, address UBS and its various roles as a financial institution in Puerto
Rico, give a brief overview of the Puerto Rican economy, and show how
the failure to implement a fiduciary standard left retail investors in Pu-
erto Rico vulnerable to UBS.
II. THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD VS.
THE SUITABILITY STANDARD
"Broker-dealers . . . under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act") are not required to provide services to their clients under the fidu-
ciary standard of care." 10 Instead, broker-dealers and registered repre-
sentatives provide services under the "suitability standard of care,"
"which generally requires only the broker-dealers' reasonable belief that
any recommendation is suitable for the client."" A financial recommen-
dation that is "suitable" for a client may or may not be a financial recom-
mendation that is in the client's best interest. 1 2
Registered Investment Advisors are financial planners who must act as
fiduciaries, as required by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("1940
Act").13 A fiduciary "acts in utmost good faith, in a manner he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the client."1 4 The distinc-
9. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS: As REQUIRED BY SEcnON 913 OF THuE DoDD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 94-95 (2011) [hereinafter SEC Study],
available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
10. Fiduciary Standard of Care, FIN. PLANNING COAL., http://financialplanningcoali-
tion.com/issues/fiduciary-standard-of-care/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).
11. Fiduciary Standard of Care, FIN. PLANNING COAL., http://financialplanningcoali-
tion.com/issues/fiduciary-standard-of-care/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
12. Id.
13. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000).
14. Terminology, CERTIFIED PLANNING BD., http://www.cfp.net/for-cfp-professionals/
professional-standards-enforcement/standards-of-professional-conduct/terminol-
ogy (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
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tion between the 1934 and 1940 statutes is based on the role of the regis-
tered representative. The 1934 Act provided for registered
representatives to essentially take instructions from clients and then sim-
ply abide by that order.15 The 1940 Act was designed to alert consumers
about the possible conflicts of interest that arise when purchasing mutual
funds (then an innovative financial product), and provided for financial
advisors to act as individuals in the business of giving advice to clients.16
The 1940 Act "thus reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate
fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship' as well as a con-
gressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest
which might incline an investment adviser - consciously or uncon-
sciously - to render advice which was not disinterested."1 7
"Brokers, technically known as registered representatives, buy and sell
securities-stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other investment products-
for their customers, including individual investors."18 Investment advi-
sors are individuals or companies that provide advice about securities tai-
lored to the needs of their clients.19 Common names for this type of
professional include asset managers, investment counselors, investment
managers, portfolio managers and wealth managers.2 0
To put this into context-for example, a supermarket-the standards
are different because a broker only provides the client with access to the
supermarket in general, whereas the advisor guides the client through
each aisle of the supermarket to make a selection. But as thousands 2 1
experienced in Puerto Rico, "the distinctions between investment advis-
ers and broker-dealers have become blurred, and participants had diffi-
culty determining whether a financial professional was an investment
adviser or a broker-dealer and instead believed that investment advisers
and broker-dealers offered the same services and were subject to the
same duties." 22 Essentially, a broker has a fiduciary duty to his client
unless "he does nothing more than act as a conduit for the customer's
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) (citing 2
Loss, Securities Regulation (2d ed. 1961), 1412).
18. See Choosing an Investment Professional, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/
choosing-investment-professional (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Mason Braswell, Finra gets arbitration process back on track in Puerto Rico,
INvr:sM uNrNitws (Apr. 14, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/arti-
cle/20140414/FREE/140419956/finra-gets-arbitration-process-back-on-track-in-pu-
erto-rico (After a brief suspension of cases, FINRA, in April 2014, resumed
arbitration hearings in Puerto Rico once it found arbitrators from the Southwest
United States and Texas to hear the cases); see also Hearing Location Statistics,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statis-
tics (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (Currently, 700 arbitrators are eligible to hear Pu-
erto Rico cases arising from purchases of closed-end funds and/or revenue bonds
sold to Puerto Rico residents. As of 2016, FINRA has 1,009 open cases in Puerto
Rico).
22. SEC Study, supra note 9, at 99.
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orders. "23
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ER-
ISA") and the Internal Revenue Code, a person is a fiduciary to the ex-
tent that he or she engages in specified activities, including "investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to
any moneys or other property of such plan." 24 But in 1975, the definition
of fiduciary was substantially narrowed by the implementation of a five-
part test, where each part must be satisfied before a person can be consid-
ered a fiduciary. 25 As a result of that implementation, many financial
advisors have no obligation to abide by the fiduciary standard, regardless
of the role they play. 2 6 Effectively, there was "no national standard . . .
requiring brokerage firms to put their clients' interests first by avoiding
making profits from conflicted advice." 27
For this reason, the Dep't of Labor recently adopted a definition of
fiduciary advice for individuals providing advice related to retirement and
investments plans. Under the new definition, a person who renders in-
vestment advice becomes a fiduciary when:
(1) providing investment or investment management recommenda-
tions or appraisals to an employee benefit plan, a plan fiduciary, par-
ticipant or beneficiary, or an IRA owner or fiduciary, and (2) either
(a) acknowledging the fiduciary nature of the advice, or (b) acting
pursuant to an agreement, arrangement, or understanding with the
advice recipient that the advice is individualized to, or specifically
directed to, the recipient for consideration in making investment or
management decisions regarding plan assets. 28
Acknowledging that certain recommendations should not fall under
the new standard, the new definition includes exceptions for, among
other things, arms-length transactions where there is generally no expec-
tation of fiduciary investment advice or those who provide investment or
retirement education. 29 The Dep't of Labor met heavy resistance prior to
its April 2016 announcement regarding the fiduciary standard. 30 Still, re-
quiring certain investment professionals to act under a fiduciary rather
23. See Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing
Guttman v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH),
para. 21,434 at 26,077 (CFTC 1982)); see also Wheeler v. Investment Managers
Commodity Corp., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), para. 20,867 at 23,552 (CFTC
1979).
24. Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule- Retirement Invest-
ment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21928 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 2509 and 2510) [hereinafter Dep't of Labor].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Joseph C. Peiffer & Christine Lazaro, Major Investor Losses Due to Conflicted
Advice: Brokerage Industry Advertising Creates the Illusion of a Fiduciary Duty, 22
PIABA B.J. 1 (2015).
28. Dep't of Labor, supra note 24, at 21929.
29. Id.
30. See Press Release, SIFMA, SIFMA Submits Comments on Department of Labor's
Proposed Retirement Regulation (July 20, 2015) (on file with author).
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than suitability standard constituted the first real change since the need
was identified in 2010.
III. DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010
Government leaders determined that a principal cause of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis was the broken financial regulatory system.3 1 The system
was fragmented, antiquated, and allowed large parts of the financial sys-
tem to operate with little or no oversight, leading to an economic disaster
of a scale and severity not seen since the Great Depression.32 Considered
"the most far reaching Wall Street reform in history," the Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, more commonly referred to as the
Dodd-Frank Act, was aimed to prevent the excessive risk-taking that was
indicative of the market and led to the financial crisis. 33 When President
Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act, he stated the legislation was "de-
signed to make sure that everybody follows the same set of rules, so that
firms compete on price and quality, not on tricks and not on traps." 34
Unfortunately, firms continued to compete on one trick not implemented
under the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act sought, among other things, to create a uniform
fiduciary standard that would bridge the gap left between the suitability
standard for registered representatives and the fiduciary standard re-
quired of registered investment advisors. 35 "The standard of conduct for
all brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personal-
ized investment advice about securities to retail customers (and such
other customers as the Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act
in the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or
other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the
advice." 36
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act also required the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") to conduct a study on investment advis-
ers and broker-dealers to evaluate "the effectiveness of existing legal or
regulatory standards of care . . . for providing personalized investment
advice and recommendations about securities to retail customers" and
whether any gaps should be addressed by rule or statute.3 7 The SEC
findings were clear.
31. See Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, Jobs & The Economy, WiriifEHousEs
.iov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-
reform (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
32. Id.
33. Id.; The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
34. Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform, Wi-irrini-iousi-.c;ov (July 21,
2010, 2:22 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-
signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.
35. SEC Study, supra note 9, at vi.
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g) (2010).
37. See SEC Study, supra note 9, at vi.
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Despite the extensive regulation of both investment advisers and
broker-dealers, retail customers do not understand and are confused
by the roles played by investment advisers and broker-dealers, and
more importantly, the standards of care applicable to investment ad-
visers and broker-dealers when providing personalized investment
advice and recommendations about securities.38
The Dodd-Frank Act, due to its sweeping nature, would protect all re-
tail investors, including the thousands of investors in Puerto Rico. By
creating one standard of care-a fiduciary standard-for all registered
representatives and all investment advisers, retail investors are better
protected from predatory advisors, regardless of the individual client's
financial literacy. Although the Dodd-Frank Act only safeguards those
receiving advice about their retirement portfolios and investments, the
Dep't of Labor decision is the much-needed first-step in a long road to
enforcing Section 913 recommendations. Until then, retail investors will
be vulnerable to their own advisors' conflicts of interest.
IV. UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND ("UBS")
In an advertisement, UBS emphasized, "until my client knows she
comes first. Until I understand what drives her. And what slows her
down. Until I know what makes her leap out of bed in the morning. And
what keeps her awake at night. Until she understands that I'm always
thinking about her investment. (Even if she isn't.) Not at the office. But
at the opera. At a barbecue. In a traffic jam. Until her ambitions feel
like my ambitions. Until then. We will not rest. UBS."39
In 2008, UBS served as an adviser to the commonwealth's Employees
Retirement System ("ERS") when it underwrote a $2.9 billion bond issue
for the pension agency and proceeded to invest half of those bonds into
twenty-three closed-end mutual funds 40 which sold exclusively to custom-
ers on the island.4 1 "It collected fees at every step." 42 As a result of the
hundreds of arbitration claims filed because of UBS' dealings with its cus-
38. Id. at 101.
39. Peiffer, supra note 27, at 9 (quoting UBS Advertisement).
40. See id. ("A closed-end fund raises a prescribed amount of capital only once
through an IPO by issuing a fixed number of shares, which are purchased by inves-
tors in the closed-end fund as stock. Unlike regular stocks, closed-end fund stock
represents an interest in a specialized portfolio of securities that is actively man-
aged by an investment advisor, and typically concentrates on a specific industry,
geographic market or sector. The stock price of a closed-end fund fluctuates ac-
cording to market forces, such as supply and demand, as well as the changing val-
ues of the securities in the fund's holdings."); see also Closed-End Fund,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/closed-endinvestment.asp
("Significantly, unlike open-end funds, most closed-end funds use leverage in an
attempt to magnify gains to investors. Using borrowed money to invest as a tool to
potentially produce bigger returns greatly amplifies the risk to the investor.").
41. David Evans, How UBS Spread the Pain of Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis to Clients,
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tomers, UBS closed three out of the five offices it maintained in Puerto
Rico, sixty of its 140 financial advisors departed the firm, and the bank's
market share fell from forty-eight percent to thirty-three percent since
2010.43
The scheme brought UBS hundreds of millions of dollars in fees and
commissions. 44 The closed-end funds, which had as much as $8.9 billion
in assets in 2009, were used to heavily invest in the Puerto Rico's munici-
pal bonds.45 For example, by mid-2013, ERS bonds represented more
than half of the net assets in five of the twenty-three funds. 4 6 Those
bonds lost more than eighty percent of their value from when they were
issued in 2008 through August 2015.47 On September 10, 2015, "Standard
& Poor's predicted with 'virtual certainty' that the bonds [would]
default." 48
Between 2008 and 2013, UBS acted as the de facto market maker, asset
manager and retail broker for a family of twenty-three closed-end funds
that predominantly held bonds that served as the lead underwriter. 4 9 It
set prices while recommending to its retail clients that they should
purchase more and more of its inventory.5 0 UBS would not reveal the
inherent conflicts of interest in these transactions. 5 ' Simultaneously,
UBS pressured its Puerto Rican registered representatives to sell more
and more closed-end funds ("CEF"), even if it meant unauthorized trad-
ing. 52 UBS argues that all of the trades during that time were suitable
and made in the best interests of their clients.5 3
V. BROKER-DEALERS AS UNDERWRITERS, ASSET
MANAGERS, MARKET MAKERS,
AND RETAIL BROKERS
UBS, like many financial institutions, can act in many capacities. Gen-







49. UBS Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico Investors Funds Disclosure Brochure, UBS
(2015) [hereinafter UBS Puerto Rico], www.ubs.com/us/en/wealth/misc/puertorico
funds/j cr-content/par/textimage.1 12314467.file/dGV4dDOvY29udGVudC9kYWO
vdWJzX21 hbnVhbF9taWcvVO1 BL2RvY3VtZW50cy9QdWVydG9fUmljbl 9GdW
5kcl9FbmcucGRm/PuertoRicoFundsEng.pdf.
50. See Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-And-Desist Proceedings, Securi-
ties Act of 1933 Release No. 9318 (May 1, 2012); see also Order Instituting Admin-
istrative and Cease-And-Desist Proceedings, Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act. of 1934 Release No. 66893 (May 1, 2012).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. According to FINRA BrokerCheck, there are approximately 200 active customer
complaints against former UBS registered representatives in Puerto Rico related
to the sale of closed-end funds and/or Puerto Rico debt instruments.
BrokerCheck, FINRA, http://brokercheck.finra.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
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tant to identify, the many hats a financial institution can wear. In Puerto
Rico, UBS or an entity within its control acted as underwriter, asset man-
ager, market maker, and retail broker.5 4 As a result, the potential for
conflicts of interest grew exponentially. To understand the increasing risk
of such conflicts, this section defines the multiple roles UBS played while
claiming to provide suitable advice to its Puerto Rican clients.
An underwriter is a financial intermediary.5 5 By underwriting bonds,
an investment banker will assume the risk of buying the newly issued
bonds from the government entity until they can resell the bonds to the
public. 56 The investment bank earns a profit, also called an underwriting
spread, based on the difference between its purchase price from the gov-
ernment and the selling price to the public.5 7 Alternatively, the financial
institution can market a new issue of government bonds rather than act-
ing as underwriter.5 8 In that case, the broker earns a commission on the
bonds sold after exercising its option to buy only enough bonds to meet
buyer demand.59
Asset management companies are also intermediaries, not only to gov-
ernments, but to households and businesses. 60 Asset managers serve a
separate function from the underwriter as they exist to direct the invest-
ment decisions for investors who have chosen to have their assets profes-
sionally managed. 61 Specifically, the asset manager's role is to reduce
risk.6 2 Asset managers can reduce risk by helping individuals diversify
among many more assets than an investor could afford to do given trans-
action costs. 6 3 They also provide a high-level of liquidity to their clients
by investing in assets that would be relatively illiquid for an individual
retail investor. 64 Whereas the underwriter earns income from bringing
the sale of the bond, the asset manager earns income from the increase in
value of assets as a whole.6 5 Whether or not there is actual incremental
value in the services provided by asset managers is still open for debate.66
The market maker accepts "the risk of holding a certain number of
shares of a particular security in order to facilitate trading in that secur-
54. UBS Puerto Rico, supra note 49.
55. See Underwriting Bond Issues, Course 105: The Process of Issuing Bonds, Invest-
ment Classroom, MORNINGs-rAl, http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course











65. Asset Management Company, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
a/asset-managementcompany.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
66. See David Teten, Asset Management is a Bizarre Industry Ripe for Disruption,
FoRBI3Es (Nov. 13, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidteten/2013/
11/13/asset-management-is-a-baffling-industry/#3dd52415464a.
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ity." 67 Thus, a market maker must always be ready for every trading day.
This allows the purchase of an investment from an investor, even if the
market maker does not have an offsetting purchaser ready to buy those
shares.68 In that case, the market maker immediately sells from its own
inventory. By doing so, the firm is literally 'making a market' for the
stock. The market maker maintains a spread on each investment cov-
ered, thereby earning its income by enabling the transaction. 69
Ordinarily, unrelated companies play the many roles mentioned above
- doing so promotes healthy competition and minimizes the risk of an
institution by putting its interests ahead of its customers. On the other
hand, a financial institution could maximize its revenues from taking on
all of these roles at once. As the underwriter, a company would be in a
position to purchase the security from the government entity at the low-
est cost. The company could then sell that inventory to an affiliate or
subsidiary acting as the market maker while paying another subsidiary to
manage the assets. With a sufficient amount of retail investor clients, the
institution can then set a higher price that its client will pay for the assets.,
The asset manager could then charge the retail client for the management
of the investment. If a client wishes to sell her shares, the market maker
can again set the price that it will purchase back the investment from the
client-which may or may not be the same price that client would
purchase shares for reinvestment.
In some cases, the market maker may choose not to take on inventory,
in which case the retail client is left with an illiquid investment that may
remain so indefinitely. While sales advertisements provide that a market
maker is not obliged to make a market, the market makers may do so to
facilitate short term client liquidity. However, as all these roles merge
over time and firm revenues increase, an institution can choose to in-
crease its inventory to a point where a security cannot be sold without it.
Upon reaching that point, the market maker eclipses its role as short-
term facilitator and becomes the gravitational force compelling the secur-
ity's value upwards or downwards. When the financial institution takes
on all these roles in the midst of a bear market or recession, and where
those instruments are not guaranteed by the full faith and credit of a state
or commonwealth, the risk of a conflict of interest is staggering.
VI. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PUERTO RICAN DEBT CRISIS
On June 2, 2015, Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla signed "a law es-
tablishing a de facto bankruptcy regime for state-owned enterprises." 7 0
"Likening the island's economic trajectory to a 'death spiral,"' the Gov-
67. Market Maker, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketmak
er.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
68. Id.
69. Market-Maker Spread, INvUs-TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mar
ketmakerspread.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
70. Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis: Neither a state nor independent, EcONOMIST (July 5,
2014) [hereinafter Puerto Rico Debt Crisis], http://www.economist.com/news/
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ernor "concluded that Puerto Rico's creditors must" be a "part of the
island's attempt to rid itself of its debt problem."7 1 Puerto Rico's eco-
nomic issues resulted from a fusion "of structural weaknesses, external
shocks, and self-inflicted wounds." 7 2
Poverty levels, unemployment levels, a corresponding fall in GDP, an
underfunded retirement system, a decline in population and the island's
skyrocketing debt all played a part in the current debt crisis. Between
2010 and 2014, forty-five percent of Puerto Ricans lived below the pov-
erty line and nearly thirty-five percent of the population received food
stamps.7 3 By comparison, in 2014 the U.S. rates were approximately fif-
teen percent and fifteen percent, respectively. 74 Puerto Rico had a per
capita income of $15,203, which is less than Mississippi, the poorest state
in the United States.7 5
Furthermore, Puerto Rico has struggled with a high unemployment
rate for decades-registering almost non-stop double digit unemploy-
ment rates every month since January 1995.76 Prior to the economic col-
lapse in 2013, Puerto Rico's official unemployment rate in December
2012 was 15.4 percent.7 7 The Puerto Rican Employees Retirement Sys-
tem's funded ratio is far worse than almost any of the fifty states.7 8 A
2010 study, paid for by the Commonwealth, noted the fund had a funded
ratio of just 6.8 percent, well below the average in the U.S.; Puerto Rico's
declining workforce also contributes to the problem.7 9 As the ratio of
workers to pensioners falls, fewer workers are left supporting the many
pensioners, creating a system where funds are extracted from the pension
at a faster rate than can be replaced.
united-states/21606319-how-territory-falls-between-bankruptcy-regimes-neither-
state-nor-independent.
71. Chandler Foust, Capital Over People? Puerto Rican Debt Crisis Explained, COUN-
CIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.coha.org/capital-over-
people-puerto-rican-debt-crisis-explained/.
72. Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, supra note 70.
73. Shiffgold, How Socialism Destroyed Puerto Rico, and How Capitalism Can Save It,
SCIIFFOOLD (July 17, 2015), http://schiffgold.com/commentaries/socialism-de-
stroyed-puerto-rico-capitalism-can-save-it/.
74. Ali Meyer, Food Stamp Beneficiaries Exceed 46,000,000 for 38 Straight Months,
CNSNEWS (Jan. 13, 2015, 9:24 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ali-
meyer/food-stamp-beneficiaries-exceed-46000000-38-straight-months.
75. Sarah Pringle, Puerto Rico's Statehood Bid Complicated by a Struggling Economy,
WALTER CRONKITE SCH. OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMC'N AT ARIZ. STATE
UNIv. (Oct. 29, 2012), http://cronkite.asu.edu/buffett/puertorico/economy.html.
76. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Puerto Rico Unemployment Statistics, DEP'T OF LABOR
(July 2016) http://www.bis.gov/eag/eag.pr.htm.
77. Id.
78. Taylor Riggs, How Puerto Rico's Debt Levels Compare With Those of U.S. States,
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2015, 12:35 PM CDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2 015-07-09 /how-puerto-rico-s-debt-levels-compare-with-those-of-u-s-states.
79. CONWAY MACKENZIE, INC., Review of the Events and Decisions That Have Led to
the Current Financial Crisis of the Employees Retirement System of the Government
of Puerto Rico, SENADO DE PUERTO Rico, (October 2010) http://www.slcg.com/
pdf/blog/1 3409.pdf.
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For several years, Puerto Rico has suffered from a long-term decrease
in its population. "From 2000 to 2010, a net 288,000 people left for the
U.S. mainland, according to the Puerto Rico Institute of Statistics."8 0 As
the economic situation worsened, the population listed "a net loss of
54,000 residents per year in 2011 and 2012, on an island of just over 3.6
million people."8 1 This exodus shrinks the island's tax base, lowers the
demand for goods and services, and leaves housing units vacant.82 Intui-
tively, as the size of the workforce shrinks, the long-term potential output
of that economy decreases. Coinciding with Puerto Rico's economic re-
cession, its issuance of municipal debt skyrocketed.83 Estimates of Puerto
Rico's public debt range from seventy percent to 100 percent of GDP. 84
The island's current debt, $70 billion, is the highest per capita out of all
U.S. states.85
While these internal issues have hurt the island, Washington, D.C. deci-
sion-making has further fueled the issues. As an overseas American ter-
ritory, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico uses the dollar and the
national minimum wage. 86 That makes the island's labor costly and its
exports uncompetitive.8 7 In saying so, from 1976-2006, firms on the is-
land were exempt from federal tax on their local profits.88 Because of
that tax break, in effect from 1976 through its phase out in 1996, "Puerto
Rico became, by a wide margin, the most attractive locale in the world for
American companies to operate in."8 9
Once the loophole closed, the economy fell into a recession.9 0 Puerto
Rico's high corporate taxes on domestic corporations, along with low
taxes on subsidiaries from the U.S. mainland, "skewed the Puerto Rican
economy toward foreign investment from the U.S." 9'1 Once the tax break
was gone, however, "foreign investment began to flee." 92 "Without a
strong domestic corporate presence to fill the void" left by the new statu-
tory framework, "the economy began to contract, along with tax
revenues."
9 3
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The Puerto Rican government implemented massive reforms, yet has
had little to show for it.94 "Cuts in government spending and increases in
taxes have further constricted the Puerto Rican economy, making it in-
creasingly difficult for the island to pay off its outstanding debt."9 5 More-
over, after the Detroit bankruptcy in July 2013, "investors fled risky
municipal bonds," which also "raised Puerto Rico's financing costs." 9 6
The government has spent too little on infrastructure and too much on
pensions. For example, the Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority still
generates sixty-five percent of its power using expensive fuel oil, which in
turn acts as a tax on economic activity.9 7 Simply put, "Puerto Rico is in a
debt crisis because the government has [grossly] overspent for years while
the island's economy was shrinking."9 8 As a result, "Puerto Rico has
been in and out of recession since 2006."99 Puerto Rico's "unemploy-
ment rate is around fourteen percent, forty-five percent of the population
lives below the federal poverty line, and there's a fiscal crisis-a scramble
to restructure debts of $73 million dollars." 00
Unfortunately, Puerto Rico's growth was wholly dependent on the tax
break. Between 1996 and 2014, Puerto Rico fell off the map as "the num-
ber of manufacturing jobs on the island fell by almost half."10 1 On Au-
gust 3, 2015, Puerto Rico defaulted to creditors of its Public Finance
Corporation when "it paid a mere $628,000 dollars toward a $58 million
dollar debt."' 0 2 This did not surprise anyone. Moody's, a credit ratings
company, had long since downgraded Puerto Rico's general obligation
debt.1 0 3 Moody's cited, among other credit challenges, the island's: (1)
"[v]ery large unfunded pension liability relative to revenues;" (2) "[v]ery
high and growing government debt relative to the size of the economy;"
(3) "[h]igh unemployment, low workforce participation, and high poverty
levels compared to the U.S.;" and (4) "[m]ulti-year trend of large General
Fund operating deficits." 104 Because "the debt is mostly owned by ordi-
nary Puerto Ricans through their credit unions," the default mostly in-
94. Foust, supra note 71.
95. Id.
96. Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, supra note 70.
97. Id.
98. Patrick Gillespie & Heather Long, Puerto Rico's Crisis . . . in 2 Minutes, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 4, 2015, 9:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/03/investing/pu-
erto-rico-crisis-in-2-minutes/.
99. Surowiecki, supra, note 89.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Patrick Gillespie, Puerto Rico Just Defaulted for the First Time, CNN MONEY
(Aug. 3, 2015, 5:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/03/investing/puerto-rico-
default/index.html?iid=EL.
103. Global Credit Research, Moody's Downgrades Puerto Rico General Obligation
and Related Bonds to Baa3 from Baal and Certain Notched Bonds to Bal,
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jures "the island's residents, [and] not Wall Street." 0 5
VII. THE EFFECT OF KEEPING THE STATUS QUO
With the governor's announcement that Puerto Rico's December 2015
debt payments would be "likely among the last Puerto Rico will make in
coming months," 0 6 there is little to suggest that the island is capable of
overcoming its financial difficulties without external aid. Currently,
"close to half of the budget goes to debt service and this is just an unsus-
tainable situation."10 7 In addition to the "need for structural reform of
the Island's economy," Congress must allow Puerto Rico to declare
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. 108
Since 1984, Puerto Rican municipalities and public corporations have
not been able to declare bankruptcy because, in that year, Congress
changed the law affecting Puerto Rican public institutions.1 09 Chapter 9
bankruptcy would allow Puerto Rico to reorganize its debt through "ex-
tending debt maturities, reducing the amount of principal or interest," or
taking on a new loan to refinance the debt. 0 But without a change in
federal law, or making Puerto Rico the fifty-first state, the island will re-
main in an endless loop of paying down debt simply to take on more.
After over two years of having Puerto Rican debt instruments being
rated as junk, Governor Padilla made a long awaited announcement. Fol-
lowing two defaults for debt owed by small government agencies and fac-
ing a $422 million dollar payment due May 1, 2016, the Governor signed
legislation enabling an immediate moratorium on non-constitutionally
guaranteed bond re-payments, to become effective on July 1, 2016.111
Furthermore, "Puerto Rico's problems stopped being legal problems and
they have started being a math problem. . . at the end of the day Puerto
Rico cannot pay." 1 12
Because investments in Puerto Rican debt were made based on the
safety of the clients' principal, despite the known problems of the Puerto
Rican economy, this act effectively rendered any promise of suitability by
105. Gillespie, supra note 98.
106. Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico to Make Most Crucial of Debt Payments on Jan. 1,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2015, 5:02 PM, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/pu-
erto-rico-will-make-most-debt-payments-due-jan-1-1451500478.
107. Interview with Michael Fletcher, Everything You Should Know About Puerto
Rico's Debt Crisis, PBS Ne.ws HoUR (July 11, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/everything-know-puerto-ricos-debt-crisis/.
108. Foust, supra note 71.
109. Id.
110. Chapter 9 - Bankruptcy Basics, in Service & Forms, AomIN. OFFIC o THE U.S.
Couwrs, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/
chapter-9-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
111. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Enacts Emergency Debt Moratorium Bill, REUTERS
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financial advisors to their clients to be meaningless.1 1 3 It is therefore
binding on broker-dealers to do more than make transactions on behalf
of their clients. Given the myriad of factors likely to be unknown by their
clients, broker-dealers must make recommendations that are in their cli-
ents' best interests.1.14 This can be difficult in straight forward relation-
ships between clients and their advisors. Thus, this is impossible when a
broker-dealer is responsible for more than just selling a stock or a bond.
VIII. UBS SUCCUMBS TO TEMPTATION
Since its inception in 1951, the Employee Retirement System ("ERS")
of the Government of Puerto Rico has been chronically underfunded.1 15
Puerto Rico's funding ratio prior to 2008 was approximately twenty per-
cent and then dropped even more due to the recession. 1.16 By compari-
son, "the three next worst average funding ratios from 2007 to 2011 were
Illinois (fifty-one percent), Connecticut (fifty-eight percent), and Ken-
tucky (fifty-nine percent)." 1 1 7 Indeed, when UBS attempted to sell ERS
bonds outside of Puerto Rico, it found no investor appetite
whatsoever.- 18
Still, even after Merrill Lynch had failed to find any market for the
same bonds, UBS led the underwriting for three separate ERS bond is-
sues in 2008.119 In January 2008, UBS offered almost $1.6 billion dollars
in Series A ERS bonds.120 In May 2008, UBS offered over $1 billion
dollars in Series B ERS bonds.121 UBS added $300 million dollars in Se-
ries C bonds to the market one month later. 122 In total, UBS acquired
$1.3 billion dollars in the sale to investors through its family of closed-end
113. See Michael Finke & Thomas Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary
Standard on Financial Advice, FPA, available at https://www.onefpa.org/journal/
Pages/The%20Impact%20of%20the%20Broker-Dealer%2Fiduciary%2OStan
dard%20on%20Financial%20Advice.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
114. Id.
115. CONWAY MACKENZIE, INC., supra note 79, at 3.
116. Craig McCann & Edward O'Neal, Sec. Litig. & Consulting Grp., UBS Succumbed
to Conflicts and Purchased $1.7 Billion of Employee Retirement System Bonds Into
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BoNos, SERHis A (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.gdb-pur.com/pdfs/pub-
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120. Id.
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MENT OF THE COMMONWEALIH OF PUERTO Rico SENIOR PENSION FUNDING
BONDS, SERIEs B (May 28, 2008), available at http://www.gdb-pur.com/inves-
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122. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TI-u GovERN-
MENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PuERTo Rico SENIOR PENSION FUNDING
BoNDs, SE3RIcs C (June 16, 2008), available at http://www.gdb-pur.com/inves-
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mutual funds. 12 3 "Merrill Lynch's plan to issue $7 billion dollars in" ERS
bonds "to investors off the island transformed into . . . UBS's plan to sell
$2.94 billion dollars on the island, of which $1.7 billion dollars had to be
bought by the UBS Funds."1 2 4
These bonds would eventually concentrate within the closed-end funds,
which would be "sold at a time when there were already fears about the
size of Puerto Rico's debt burden and the weakness of its economy." 12 5
As UBS Puerto Rico President Miguel Ferrer stated in a June 2011 sales
meetings with registered representatives weary of the timing of these in-
vestments, "[w]e have in your accounts almost one billion dollars in cash
that does not generate commissions . .. [y]ou have current yield, and you
have a history of good performance. What the f[]ck do you want?" 1 2 6
In addition to the unmarketable ERS bonds, UBS underwrote "$1.35
billion dollars of COFINA bonds (Puerto Rico Sales Tax Revenue bonds)
and bought them into the UBS Puerto Rican Funds in 2007 and 2008."127
Because there was no other market for these bonds, UBS sold $3 billion
dollars of bonds it did not underwrite to make room for the ERS and
COFINA bonds within its closed-end funds. 1 2 8 UBS registered repre-
sentatives would also be able to buy and sell different securities from
within its own family of closed-end funds, charging arbitrary and exces-
sive mark ups as they did.1 2 9 While the average underwriting spread for
municipal bonds is 0.8 percent, UBS charged its own clients 1.05 percent
for no apparent reason. 130
By 2013, the UBS underwritten ERS and COFINA bonds lost $464
million dollars.13' The disastrous losses suffered by Juan Burgos and
other investors in the UBS Puerto Rican Funds in 2013 were "directly
traceable to UBS putting its interests ahead of its clients in 2008."132 In
all, UBS was the lead or participating underwriter in several revenue
123. McCann, supra note 116.
124. Craig McCann, Sec. Litig. & Consulting Grp., 15 Days in Puerto Rico Cost UBS
Clients Over $1 Billion, SLCG BLOc (Dec. 4, 2014), http://blog.sicg.com/2014/12/
15-days-in-puerto-rico-cost-ubs-clients.htmi [hereinafter 15 Days in Puerto Rico].
125. Suzanne Barlyn, Exclusive: Recording Shows How UBS Drove Reluctant Brokers
to Sell High-risk Puerto Rico Funds, Ri-u-n ,As (Feb. 6, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/us-ubs-puertorico-tactics-idUSKBNOLAOFN 20150206?irpc=
932.
126. Evans, supra note 41.
127. Craig McCann & Edward O'Neal, Sec. Litig. & Consulting Grp., What Hell Hath
UBS Puerto Rico Wrought, SLCG BioG (Nov. 13, 2014 http://blog.sicg.com/2014/
11/what-hell-hath-ubs-puerto-rico-wrought.html [hereinafter What Hell Hath UBS
Puerto Rico Wrought].
128. Id.
129. Geng Deng et al., Sec. Litig. & Consulting Grp., Did UBS Charge its Proprietary
Puerto Rico Bon Funds Excessive Markups?, SLCG BLOG (Dec. 18, 2013), http://
blog.slcg.com/2013/12/did-ubs-charge-its-proprietary-puerto.html.
130. Craig McCann, Sec. Litig. & Consulting Grp., Did UBS Charge its Proprietary Pu-
erto Rico Bond Funds Excessive Markups? Part II, SLCG Bi.oo (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://blog.sicg.com/2014/01/did-ubs-charge-its-proprietary-puerto.html [hereinaf-
ter Part I1].
131. What Hell Hath UBS Puerto Rico Wrought, supra note 125.
132. Id.
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bonds issued by agencies of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, includ-
ing: Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico ("GDB"), Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority ("PRASA"), and GDB "Build
America Bonds." 133
Between December 2012 and March 2013, many of these bonds, which
were also underlying holdings within the CEFs peddled by UBS, were
downgraded to near "junk status." 134 By early 2014, Moody's, Standard
& Pour ("S&P"), and Fitch rated Puerto Rico's general obligation bonds
as non-investment grade securities.13 5 Still, UBS continued to sell these
securities, even to retirees who required the income in order to maintain
themselves.136 Investors complained that not only were they unaware
about these conflicts of interest, they were also repeatedly told these in-
vestments were guaranteed and safe.137 Because these advisors failed to
put the interests of their clients ahead of their own, the losses have been
severe.
In fact, the egregious manner in which some advisors violated the fidu-
ciary standard magnified the losses. Even though the closed-end funds
were already highly leveraged, UBS clients "were encouraged by [their]
brokers to borrow even more money to invest in those funds."1 38 In
2013, the Tax Free Puerto Rico Fund II had a leverage ratio of fifty-three
percent, "meaning for every dollar of customer assets it holds, it has
roughly another dollar of assets bought with borrowed money."1 3 9 Fur-
thermore, "the Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund could issue debt securi-
ties worth up to fifty percent of its total assets." 14 0
While the closed-end funds leveraged their portfolio by financing about
half of the assets, "[r]egistered representatives of UBS . . . offered clients
loans secured by shares they already owned," and used the proceeds of
133. Brian Chappatta, Which Puerto Rico Bond Defaults Next? A 1600% Yield Says It
All, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
04-29/which-puerto-rico-bond-defaults-next-a-1-600-yield-says-it-all.
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the loans to buy more shares in the closed-end funds.1 4 1 "Typically, cus-
tomers use margin loans to buy securities on borrowed funds," which are
governed by regulators to "limit the amount of risk a customer can take
on."1 .4 2 For the UBS Puerto Rican clients, "many fund investors also
used leverage to buy shares of the fund and were especially hard hit." 143
Investors, required to meet margin calls at depressed prices, were "forced
to liquidate hundreds of millions of dollars in holdings in these funds." 1 4 4
IX. THE MOST VULNERABLE AMONG US
In 2012, the SEC enabled an Investor Advisory Committee ("IAC") to
study the impact of broker-dealer fiduciary duty on the most imperiled
stakeholder of all - the retail investor. Among its 2013 findings, the
JAC discovered that:
(1) "Over the last several decades, however, the roles of some bro-
ker-dealers and investment advisers have converged."1 4 5
(2) "Because federal regulations have not kept pace with changes in
business practice, broker- dealers and investment advisers are
subject to different legal standards when they offer advisory
services."1 46
(3) "Those legal standards-a suitability standard for broker-dealers
and a fiduciary duty for investment advisers-afford different
levels of protection to the investors who rely on those
services."1 47
(4) "[I]nvestors generally treat their relationships with both broker-
dealers and investment advisers as relationships of trust and ex-
pect that the recommendations they receive will be in their best
interests."1 4 8
(5) "Investors may be harmed if they choose a financial adviser under
a mistaken belief that the financial adviser is required to act in
their best interest when that is not the case."
(6) "These types of harm can nonetheless have a significant impact on
investors' financial well-being." 14 9
141. Laura Marcinek, UBS Employee Takes Leave Amid Review of Puerto Rico Loans,
Bi oolvBlR (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-10-04/
ubs-employee-takes-leave-amid-review-of-puerto-rico-loans.htmi.
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144. Craig, supra note 138.
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Based on these findings, the IAC made two recommendations. First,
"[t]he Commission should conduct a rulemaking to impose a fiduciary
duty on broker-dealers when they provide personalized investment ad-
vice to retail investors."150 Additionally, in implementing the new rule,
the SEC should create "a uniform, plain English disclosure document to
be provided to customers and potential customers of broker-dealers and
investment advisers at the start of the engagement, and periodically
thereafter, that covers basic information about the nature of services of-
fered, fees and compensation, conflicts of interest, and disciplinary
record." 5 1
The IAC noted two historical objections to this rule making approach.
The first objection is based on the idea that broker-dealers are already
heavily regulated. This argument is irrelevant because "the question is
not whether broker-dealers are adequately regulated when they act as
[broker-dealers] but whether they are adequately regulated" when giving
advice, i.e. acting as advisers. 152
The second objection is that regulation is not needed because "inves-
tors are capable of choosing for themselves whether they prefer to work
with a broker-dealer operating under a suitability standard or an invest-
ment adviser who is a fiduciary." 153 The IAC cited to numerous studies
that found conclusively that:
[I]nvestors today do not have the tools to make an informed choice.
Specifically, investors do not distinguish between broker-dealers and
investment advisers, do not know that broker-dealers and investment
advisers are subject to different legal standards, do not understand
the differences between a suitability standard and a fiduciary duty,
and expect broker- dealers and investment advisers alike to act in
their best interests when giving advice and making recommenda-
tions. This is the natural result of regulatory policy that has allowed
brokers to rebrand themselves as advisers without being regulated as
advisers. 154
While "the lack of [a fiduciary] standard has real-world implications for
investors," 155 financial institutions may rely on case law that is far re-
moved from a typical customer's awareness. For example, "no fiduciary
duty arises between a broker and his client in relation to a non-discretion-
ary commodity trading account."1 56 In Greenwood v. Dittmer ("Green-
wood"), a case applying Arkansas law and arising over the sale of
commodities in feeder cattle, the central issue in determining that the
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vice and information from the broker.1 57 Rather, the Greenwood court
based its decision on the account status being listed as "non-
discretionary."' 5 8
Still, the Eighth Circuit would later decline to expand the Greenwood
standard beyond the state of Arkansas. Instead, in Davis v. Merrill
Lynch ("Davis"), the Eighth Circuit noted that it was neither bound nor
persuaded by Greenwood, and declined to apply its holding to overrule
the well-supported judgment of the district court that a fiduciary duty
exists between licensed securities brokers and their customers under
South Dakota law.' 59 The Davis court also noted that both the status of
the account and who actually exercised control is to be examined in de-
termining whether a fiduciary duty exists. 16 0 Many jurisdictions have
similarly promoted substance over form when determining that a fiduci-
ary standard is appropriate. 161 Therefore, it would seem that common
law is in line with current thinking in a post-Dodd-Frank landscape.
But policy groups, including the largest group representing the United
States securities industry, its broker-dealers, banks and asset managers,
advocate against the uniform fiduciary standard.1 62 By extension, these
groups advocate for a status quo that promotes the fallacy that broker-
dealers generally operate in the best interests of their retail investors.
These policy groups generally argue that a change to the current require-
ment will restrict access to financial advice and raise the cost of saving for
investors.1 63 In a 2014 op-ed, the President and CEO of SIFMA asserted
that:
[I]nvestors can choose the type of investment professionals and ser-
vices they want and the manner in which they prefer to pay for these
services. Those with greater needs may choose to work with an in-
157. Id. at 786-788.
158. Id. at 788.
159. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1216-17
(8th Cir. 1990) ("Davis").
160. Id. at 1217.
161. See Leboce, S.A. v. Merrill-Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F.2d 605, 607
(9th Cir. 1983) (held California law imposes fiduciary obligations "where the agent
'for all practical purposes' controls the account"); see also Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding a fiduciary relationship exists
without placing undue emphasis on the nature of an account); see also Mihara v.
Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) (showing in the context of
churning, "the requisite degree of control is met when the client routinely follows
the recommendations of the broker" such that "a pattern of de facto control by the
broker" develops); see also Corbey v. Grace, 605 F. Supp. 247, 253 (D. Minn. 1985)
(noting that a plaintiff seeking to establish a fiduciary relationship with a broker
had to specify the content of a special agreement); see also Moore v. Turner, 71
S.E.2d 342, 349 (1952) (quoting 8 Am. Jur., Brokers, § 86 that a "broker [employed
to sell coal property] is a fiduciary required to exercise fidelity and good faith
toward his principal in all matters within the scope of his employment.").
162. Position, in Fiduciary Standard Resource Center, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/is-
sues/private-client/fiduciary-standard/position/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
163. Carol Danko, SIFMA Statement on DOL Fiduciary Rule, Omnibus Appropriations
Act, in Newsroom, SIFMA (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2015/
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vestment adviser who provides individualized investment advice for
an asset-based advisory fee, hourly fee or annual retainer.1 6 4
His words artfully dodge the thorough history at the heart of the SEC
findings and the Dep't of Labor's current path. At the June 2011 UBS
sales meeting, despite UBS advisors' trepidation in selling CEFs they
thought to be unsuitable for a list of twenty-two problems, then CEO,
Ferrer, pressured his employees into selling the CEFs to their retail cli-
ents by saying:
I am going to read it to you, there are twenty-two (22) [items]. I
think we could come up with fifty (50) or one hundred (100) if we
wanted to . . . Poor liquidity; Excessive leverage; An increase in in-
terest; Security; Instability; Excessive Offer; Bad reputation; Spread
pressure; Geographic Concentration; Lending Capability; Lack of
Information; UBS Commitment; Trust of Brokers; Charity; Rating
versus one-o-three (103);Lack of correlation; Size of Interest Lines;
Form of Sales; Lack of Publicity; Stable Reporting; Management
Costs; No trail. We are f-cked. So, we either do something or we
end this meeting, have a cup of coffee and go home. Because if we
do not have that product, which is the only thing that is available
right now, you have nothing to do. I guess you should look for an-
other job. If you want to earn gross, then we have to take this and
make a list of three or four positive things that you have.1 6 5
Investor-focused trade associations "have sought to ensure that any
rules adopted provide sufficient clarity regarding their regulatory obliga-
tions and continue to permit them to offer traditional, transaction-based
brokerage services."1 66 Groups like the Public Investors Arbitration Bar
Association ("PIABA") work to translate the positions of industry
groups who only pay lip service to protect investor rights. Noting that the
National Association of Plan Advisors ("NAPA") equates a rule gov-
erning conflicts of interest with a rule creating a barrier to investment
advice, PIABA explains that NAPA is really arguing that "prohibiting
conflicts of interests would block Americans from working with the finan-
cial advisors and investment providers they trust simply because they of-
fer different financial products like annuities and mutual funds - with
different fees." 167 NAPA's logic fails an intuitive, much less rationale,
analysis. In fact, "[a]ctual data, as opposed to the rhetoric and hyperbole,
demonstrates that the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon brokers has no
meaningful impact on cost to investors or access to investment advice." 168
164. Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Helping American Investors Save for Retirement, in Penn-
sylvania + Wall, SIFMA (May 9, 2014), http://www.sifma.org/blog/helping-ameri-
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165. Audio tape: Miguel Ferrer's address, http://mediacdn.reuters.com/media/us/edito-
rial/assets/FERRER.mp4 (approx. at 3:40) (link also available at Barlyn, supra
note 125) (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
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One thing is clear, though - the path towards establishing a uniform
fiduciary standard for brokers who make investment recommendations is
not as straightforward as it would seem. Since 2010, when the Dodd-
Frank Act was enforced through the recent decision made by the Dep't of
Labor in 2016, a disheartening trend has developed. In response to the
recession of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to protect all investors
from Wall Street predators. In 2012, the IAC recommended the uniform
fiduciary standard to protect retail investors.169 By 2016, after significant
securities industry pushback, the Dep't of Labor plan only provides aid to
individuals with retirement plans. 170 While studies clearly show that
Americans outside the "one percent" need the protections afforded by a
fiduciary standard, Wall Street proponents have successfully narrowed
the number of Americans that could potentially seek a safe harbor within
its shores. Even so, the Dep't of Labor decision to require a fiduciary
standard for those providing retirement plan advice does generate a
flicker of hope for retail investors nationwide.
X. CONCLUSION
For retail investors like those in Puerto Rico, or anywhere within the
United States, the SEC must require a uniform fiduciary standard for all
investment advisers and broker-dealers that is no less stringent than the
existing fiduciary standard for investment advisers. Had the recommen-
dations of the Dodd-Frank Act been adopted in 2010, or any time before
the collapse of the Puerto Rico bond market in 2013, UBS and other
financial institutions would have been required to act in the best interests
of Juan Burgos and thousands of other Puerto Rican clients.
While UBS Puerto Rico admitted no wrongdoing when it settled with
the SEC for $26.6 million dollars, an SEC statement noted that "UBS
Puerto Rico denied its closed-end fund customers what they were entitled
to under the law - accurate price and liquidity information, and a trading
desk that did not advantage UBS's trades over those of its customers."1 7 '
According to the securities industry, "broker-dealers act in their client's
best interests because they know their clients expect them to do so and
clients can always take their business elsewhere." 172 Puerto Rican inves-
tors experienced otherwise. Until the federal government requires adop-
169. See SEC's Investor Advisory Committee Recommends Framework for Uniform Fi-
duciary Duty Governing Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors, MORGAN
LE~wis, https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/secs-investor-advisory-committee (last
visited Dec. 11, 2013).
170. Liz Skinner, The DOL fiduciary rule will forever change financial advice, and the
industry has to adapt, INv. NiEws (May 9, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20160509/FEATURE/160509939/the-dol-fiduciary-rule-will-forever-change-
financial-advice-and-the.
171. Press Release, SEC Charges UBS Puerto Rico & Two Executives with Defrauding
Fund Customers, Wash. D.C. (May 1, 2012) (on file with author), available at
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171488798.
172. See Bentsen, supra note 164.
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tion of a fiduciary standard for all investment recommendations, history
warns us that millions will continue to lose billions.
